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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SNOW FLOWER HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SNOW FLOWER, LTD., JACK W. 
DAVIS, INC. a California corporation, 
and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 20000316-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The Association hereby submits this Reply Brief of Appellant in response to 
Davis' Brief of Appellee and addresses the arguments set forth therein. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DAVIS DEVELOPED THE CONDOMINIUM PROJECT 
SUBJECT TO THE UTAH CONDOMINIUM 
OWNERSHIP ACT AND WARRANTED THAT THE 
PROJECT WOULD BE BUILT IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE BUILDING CODES 
Davis, in its Brief of Appellee, first responds to the contention of the express 
warranties regarding the construction of the Project citing language in the Earnest Money 
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and the Real Estate Contracts. In so doing, Davis contends that these purchase contracts 
contain a provision absolving it from any warranty with respect to the Project. However, 
the case law is clear that this warranty, or lack thereof, is eliminated. Under the "merger 
doctrine" all prior agreements or terms, whether written or oral, are extinguished. In 
Schafir v. Harrigan. 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), this Court held that "the merger 
doctrine extinguishes the Earnest Money Sales Agreement and makes preeminent the 
warranty deed." Accordingly, that which is contained or referenced in the Warranty Deed 
and/or documents recorded against the property is controlling. 
With that in mind, the relevant documents which must be reviewed are the transfer 
documents and the Condominium Declaration for Snow Flower Condominiums. The 
Association in its initial Brief of Appellant went into much detail as to the language 
contained in those documents. Suffice it to say, each of these documents referenced and 
subjected the Project to the provision of the Utah Condominium Ownership Act, U.C.A. 
§57-8-1 et seq. ("Condominium Act") 
Davis prepared and recorded the Condominium Declaration against the property. 
To this day, these declarations continue to control the operation and use of the property. 
Davis' does not dispute that it was the owner/developer of the Project and that it was to 
construct the development pursuant to the Condominium Declaration along with the 
Condominium Act. (See "Condominium Declaration" in Addendum of Brief of 
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Appellant.) The question here is what is the meaning of the language contained in the 
Condominium Declaration and what is the purpose of the Condominium Act. 
Through the Condominium Declaration, Davis has expressly represented the 
condition of the Project and its intention for development. Davis stated that it "intends to 
establish said condominium project under and pursuant to the provisions of the 
Condominium Act." (R. 169) Davis further declared that "said real property shall be . . . 
sold, and improved, subject to the provisions and conditions of the following declarations, 
. . . all of which, pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Condominium Act, shall be 
enforceable equitable servitudes, where reasonable, and shall run with the land, and shall 
be binding upon Declarant. .." (See ARTICLE I, RECITALS, paragraph D, 
Condominium Declaration, Addendum to Brief of Appellant.) As part of the 
development, Davis prepared and recorded on the subject property a Record of Survey 
Map ("Survey Map") wherein Davis certified that it was "submitting the described 
property to the Utah Condominium Ownership Act." (R. 181; See Addendum) Davis 
further declared that "it is the intention of Declarant that the provisions of the Act shall 
apply to the Condominium Project and that the provisions of this Declaration shall be 
construed in accordance therewith." (ARTICLE III, APPLICABILITY OF ACT. 
Condominium Declaration, Addendum to Brief of Appellant, R. 168) 
These written documents which have been recorded upon the property provide 
express representations that the Project was to be constructed and improved by Davis in 
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accordance with the Condominium Act. Davis in its Brief of Appellee does not dispute 
these facts. Davis does not even address these representations. Davis simply states that 
any references to the Condominium Declaration or the Survey Map are for description 
purposes only. (See Brief of Appellee at 15, footnote 9.) However, there is much more 
meaning and purpose to these documents. 
Davis expressly represented that the condominiums would be constructed in 
compliance with the Condominium Act. Davis, while not disputing that the 
Condominium Act applies, argues, however, that the Condominium Act does not require 
the project to built in accordance with the building code. This is contrary to the language 
of the Condominium Act. 
The Condominium Act contains a specific provision which requires that a 
condominium project be built according to the building codes. The Association is not 
alleging or asserting that minor quality standards have not been met, the facts indicate 
that the condominium project has significant defects where the construction does not even 
meet the minimum building codes. Section 57-8-35(2) of the Act states: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be interpreted to state or imply that a 
condominium project,... is exempt by this chapter from compliance with 
the zoning ordinance, building and sanitary codes, and similar development 
regulations which have been adopted by a municipality or county. No 
condominium project... or any structure within said project shall be 
permitted which is not in compliance with said ordinances and codes. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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The stated purpose requires that condominium projects which are constructed under the 
Condominium Act must be built in compliance with the governing ordinances and 
building codes. This isn't a suggestion, it is a requirement. The Association is entitled to 
rely upon these express requirements that the condominiums that they are purchasing are 
in compliance with the minimum building codes. This Project developed by Davis has not 
been exempted from this provision, or any other, of the Condominium Act. 
Even though it was stated previously in the Brief of Appellant, it appears that it is 
important to restate this important concept. When discussing the Condominium Act, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated that the "statute should be construed so that effect is given to 
all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, 
and so that one section will not destroy another..." Brickyard Homeowners Association 
Management Committee v. Gibbons Realty Company. 668 P.2d 535, 538 (Utah 1983). 
All provisions of the Condominium Act have an intended purpose and must be construed 
to give effect to that purpose. 
The trial court ruled that there were no express warranties. (F of F #5; R. 215) The 
Association again asserts that this ruling was in error. The trial court ignored the written 
documents, the application of the Condominium Act, and the requirement that the Project 
be built in compliance with all building codes. The Association has the right to maintain 
its action against Davis under this express warranty. 
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Davis has breached this warranty when the Project was not built in compliance 
with the building codes. The latent code violation were significant. (See Affidavit of 
Rhoades ffif 7, 8, and 9; R. 163) Davis does not dispute the fact that the Project was 
constructed in violation of the building codes but argues that it was not required to build 
the Project according to the building codes. 
Accordingly, the trial court committed error by ruling that there was no express 
warranty as described above. The Association requests that the trial court's ruling be 
reversed and this matter be remanded for further proceedings. 
II. DAVIS HAS BREACHED ITS IMPLIED WARRANTY 
AND BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF 
FITNESS 
Davis' sole argument in its Brief of Appellee regarding the implied warranty cause 
of action relies upon American Towers Owners Assoc, v. CCI Mechanical 930 P.2d 1182 
(Utah 1996). The Association contends that American Towers is distinguishable and not 
controlling upon the facts of the case at hand. In American Towers, the association was 
proceeding against remote third-parties for defective construction performed by the 
respective third-parties under the theory of implied warranty of habitability. The court in 
American Towers was specifically addressing the situation between remote parties and 
further cited Maack v. Resource Design & Construction, Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) to support its conclusion. Once again in Maack, that case dealt with claims 
from a subsequent purchaser of a home against the contractor who built the home. It is 
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under those scenarios, where there was no privity of contract, that the courts have ruled 
there is no implied warranty of habitability. Further, the Supreme Court in American 
Towers did not address the Condominium Act and the implied warranty provided therein 
as argued in this case. 
When parties enter into a contract, there may be implied warranties which exist as 
part of the contract. In this case, there is a contractual relationship between the parties. 
Davis, in its position of being the developer/seller impliedly warrants that the new 
construction is built, at a minimum, to the building codes. These implied warranties are 
an indispensable part of the contract to the sale. (See Strathmore Riverside v. Paver 
Development Corp.. 369 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)). These types of warranties were 
provided at the transfer of property. 
As argued previously, Davis has specifically, or at a minimum impliedly, 
represented and warranted to the Association that the condominiums were built in 
accordance the Condominium Act requiring that the condominiums be built in 
compliance with the building codes. Davis, who developed and sold the Project, was in 
the position to insure the Project was built to code. Davis impliedly warranted to the 
purchasers that the Project was built to code. However, the facts now demonstrate that 
the condominiums were not built in compliance with the applicable building codes and 
ordinances. (Affidavit of Rhoads, # 7 and 8; R. 163). These code deficiencies were not 
visible or discoverable by the purchasers at the time of purchase. These latent 
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deficiencies could not have been discovered by an inspection and were only discovered 
recently after the Association removed the walls during a remodeling project. These code 
violations which posed significant danger to the inhabitants have now been corrected by 
the Association. 
The Association filed this action alleging breach of implied warranty and breach of 
implied warranty of fitness. The Association in its Complaint sets forth a claim under 
these implied warranty theories upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the trial 
court committed error by ruling that there was no implied warranty as described above. 
The Association requests that the trial court's ruling be reversed and this matter be 
remanded for further proceedings. 
III. THE ASSOCIATION IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM 
MAINTAINING AN ACTION IN TORT AGAINST 
DAVIS 
Davis again relies upon American Towers for the proposition that the Associations 
tort claims are barred by the economic loss doctrine. As stated above, American Towers 
is distinguishable. As quoted by Davis from American Towers: 
[A] developer can contract for low-grade materials that meet only minimum 
requirements of the building code. When the developer sells those units, a 
buyer should not be able to turn around and sue the builder for the poor 
quality of construction. Presumably, the buyer received what he paid for or 
he can bring a contract claim against his seller. 
930P.2dat l l90. 
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There are two important issues raised here. The court is indicating that the buyer 
should not be able to sue to the builder for the poor quality of construction. That was the 
premise of that lawsuit. American Towers indicates that parties who not in privity of 
contract may not sue for economic losses. In this case, the Association is suing Davis, the 
developer/seller of the Project, not the builder. 
Second, the first sentence quoted above states that the developer may "contract for 
low-grade materials that meet only minium requirements of the building code." Id at 
1190. However in this case, the project did not even meet the minimum requirements of 
the building code. Suing for poor quality or "nothing more than disappointed 
expectations" (American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1191) is one thing, significant violations of 
the building code is another. 
While the Association does have contractual claims against Davis, those claims do 
not preclude the assertion of additional tort claims. Utah case law provides that parties 
who have contract claims may also have tort claims against the same defendants. The 
Supreme Court of Utah has recognized this theory. (See Interwest Construction v. 
Palmen 923 P.2d 1350 (Utah 1996) and DCR Incorporated v. Peak Alarm Company, 663 
P.2d 433 (Utah 1983)). The Supreme Court stated that the terms of the contract between 
the parties was "insufficient as a matter of law to exempt [the parties] suppliers from 
strict tort or negligence liability." Interwest at 1356. Such is the case here. While there 
are documents and contract theories upon which the Association may recover, the 
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the specific obligations expressed in the contract itself." DCR Incorporated at 435. 
The Association contends that Davis has a contractual duty (i.e. warranties) along 
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duty gives rise to the Association's tort cause of action. 
The trial court dismissed the Association's tort causes of action based upon the 
Economic Loss Rule and American Towers. However; the Economic Loss Rule as set 
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made them unreasonably dangerous to others amounting to liability under the theory of 
strict liability. 
Accordingly, the trial court committed error by ruling that there tort theories were 
barred by the Economic Loss Rule as described above. The Association requests that the 
trial court's ruling be reversed and this matter be remanded for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth herein and in the Brief of Appellant, the Association has stated a claim 
upon which recovery may be made against Davis. Davis sold defective units to members 
of the Association. The relevant case law, the Condominium Act, and the facts of this 
case supports its claim of the existence of a warranty and that said warranty has been 
breached by Davis. The Association has also provided the basis for it's implied warranty 
claims. Also, there are tort causes of action which are available to the Association 
independent of the contract claims. For the reasons contained herein, the Association 
respectfully requests that the trial court's rulings be reversed and the matter be remanded 
to trial. 
DATED this 26th day of December, 2000. 
BABCOCK, BOSTWICK, SCOTT 
CRAWLEY & PRICE 
\l 
Jy: Robert F. Babcock 
Brian J. Babcock 
Attorneys for Appellant/Plaintiff 
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